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COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AND COLLECTIVE LOYALTIES IN FRANCE: 
WHY THE FRENCH REVOLUTION MADE A DIFFERENCE 
It is impossible to pronounce the words "collective violence in France" without conjuring up 
the name of Charles Tilly. Ever since 1964, when he published a brilliant book on the Vendee 
rebellion against the French Revolution, Tilly has poured forth an endless stream of articles and 
books on the problem of collective violence. Most of this work deals with France, although more 
recently he has published on the English case as well.' Given Tilly's well-earned hegemony over 
the field, my interpretation of the history of collective violence in France is inevitably also a 
critique of Tilly's interpretation. I therefore want to begin by making clear how much I owe to his 
work, both empirical and theoretical. To begin with, Tilly has gathered, analyzed, and published 
vast quantities of information about collective violence. One sign of the importance of his 
empirical work is that the critique I mount in this article is largely based on evidence that Tilly 
himself has collected. 
Tilly's theoretical contributions are no less important. Before he began writing, most 
sociologists treated collective violence as a pathological phenomenon -- as the result of social 
dislocations, strain, anomie, breakdown of social control, and the like. They assumed that in a 
properly functioning social order all the groups or classes composing a population would be in 
harmony with each other and that conflict leading to violence could result only from some kind of 
malfunctioning of an essentially benign social system. This approach, besides leading to all sorts 
of empirically doubtful conclusions, also had what I and many of my contemporaries regarded as 
an unsavory political bias: it placed the social scientist on the side of law and order and the status 
quo. For those of us who balked when Neil Smelser characterized English factory workers 
agitating for the Ten Hour Day as  suffering from "unjustified negative emotional reactions and 
unrealistic aspirations," Tilly's work was a breath of fresh air.2 
Tilly begins from a very different set of assumptions. He sees society as  composed of 
groups with conflicting interests which are held together not by a value consensus or by the re- 
equilibrating motions of a finely tuned social system but by the exercise of economic and political 
power. He treats conflicts between different groups as an inevitable feature of social life, and 
argues that collective violence typically arises when groups act to defend or extend their own 
interests -- however conceived -- against others. Hence collective violence, far from being an 
irrational outburst of anomic and disturbed social marginals, is usually the consequence of 
purposeful collective action of a constituted group of some kind. This theoretical perspective also 
has an important methodological implication. Incidents of collective violence -- riots, scuffles 
between crowds and police, violent demonstrations, brawls between rival groups -- are much more 
likely to find their way into the historical record than ordinary, non-violent collective activities. If 
it is true that collective violence grows out of day-to-day loyalties, habits, values, and patterns of 
organization, then the relatively well-recorded violent events can be used a s  a kind of tracer for 
collective action and collective loyalties in general. This makes the study of collective violence a 
far more important task of sociology and social history than it would seem if we accepted the 
"pathological" approach. Violent events, rather than being a series of curiosities occasionally 
thrown off by society in its basically orderly course of development, become indicators of the basic 
power struggles -- and, I would add, of the fundamental loyalties -- that determine the very shape 
of the social order. Tilly has demonstrated that the study of collective violence leads straight to 
the most basic processes of social change. 
TILLY'S ACCOUNT OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE 
How, according to Tilly, has collective violence changed in France over the past three 
centuries? In his various writings, Tilly has attempted to specify different types of collective 
violence and to chart their rise or fall over time. Initially he distinguished three types, which he 
dubbed "primitive," "reactionary," and "modern" violence; later, perhaps nervous about the 
evolutionary and teleological overtones of these terms, he substituted the more neutral and clinical 
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"competitive," "reactive," and "proactive" violence -- without, however, significantly changing the 
definitions of the categories3 In his most recent work on the subject, a massive tome entitled 
tentious French, he silently abandons all of these terms, but without, in my opinion, 
abandoning the fundamental theoretical framework of which they are a product or the narrative 
line that they summarize. (His summary table contrasting what he now labels the "parochial and 
patronized" forms of collective action that dominated the period 1650-1850 with the "national and 
autonomous" forms that predominated after 1850 essentially recapitulates, with a few 
elaborations, the familiar differences between "communal and reactive" collective action on the one 
hand and "proactive" collective action on the ~ t h e r . ~ )  I believe that Tilly7s essential argument can 
still be explicated most economically by using his typology of competitive, reactive, and proactive 
violence. 
Competitive violence includes feuds, brawls between the youth of neighboring villages, 
battles between rival groups of artisans, and charivaris -- raucous serenades, sometimes 
accompanied by assault or destruction of property, usually performed by the young men of the 
community against those who infringe local customs. According to Tilly, this kind of violence, a 
product of the constant contentions in local communities, was the most common sort before the 
intensive seventeenth century efforts a t  centralizing the French state which we associate with the 
names of Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV. 
The exigencies of state-building resulted in a burgeoning of Tilly's second type, "reactive 
-." By reactive, Tilly means "defensive, backward looking conflicts between ... local 
people ... and agents of the nation.lv5 As the state demanded ever greater tax resources, drew local 
grain supplies into the national market, and promoted capitalist development, local people 
responded with tax rebellions, food riots, invasion of enclosed lands and forests, and the like. 
These "reactive" forms of collective violence became dominant by the late seventeenth century and 
remained the most common form right down to the middle of the nineteenth century. There was a 
last great outburst of reactive violence in 1848, but the 1848 revolution and the intensified 
administrative centralization of the Second Empire seem finally to have wiped out overt resistance 
to the expansion of the state. There was virtually no "reactive" collective violence in France after 
1851. 
Tilly's third type, proactive violence, has been the predofiinant form of collective violence 
since the middle of the nineteenth century. In proactive violence, groups are no longer resisting 
the expansion of the state but are attempting to control or influence it. The groups that engage in 
such violence are formally organized special-purpose associations rather than communal groups, 
and they have highly articulated goals. Proactive forms of collective action -- such a s  the strike, 
the demonstration and the political meeting -- were developed progressively during the late 
eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, as  people began to accept state intrusion a s  a fact of life 
and began to recognize the need to act on a national scale to influence the state's activities. But 
proactive collective violence -- that is, collective violence that arose out of associationally based, 
forward looking, and nationally oriented collective action -- did not become the predominant form 
until after the Revolution of 1848. 
This account of the history of collective violence borrows from both Tocqueville and Marx, 
with much more of Tocqueville than Marx. The account is Tocquevillian because the chief 
determinant of changes in the forms of collective violence is not the advance of capitalism but the 
rise of the centralized, bureaucratic state. It was the rise of the state that displaced competitive 
violence by reactive violence in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and it was 
the final victory of the state over local resistance that caused reactive violence to be eclipsed by 
proactive violence after 1848. But the state whose gradual and inexorable rise is traced out by 
incidents of collective violence is a state that consistently favored capitalism. In Tilly's account, 
capitalism and the rise of the state, although distinct processes, are tightly intertwined. Many of 
the classic forms of Tilly's "reactive" violence are directed as much against capitalist intrusion 
favored or fostered by the state a s  against state control per se. Take, for example, the grain riot, 
probably the most important type of reactive violence in the eighteenth century and through much 
of the nineteenth. Grain riots typically took place a t  a time of high grain prices, when the 
sufficiency of local supplies was threatened by the shipment of grain to other areas -- particularly 
to Paris -- where it could fetch a higher price. In grain riots, local people would seize grain being 
stored by local merchants and farmers or would block barges or wagons loaded with grain to be 
transported out of the area. Once the grain had been seized it was usually sold to local people at a 
"just price" -- in other words, a t  considerably below its market value. The grain riot was a t  once a 
protest against the local officials' unwillingness or inability to carry out their traditional role of 
assuring local people's access to local grain supplies and a protest against the extension of market 
principles into the realm of subsistence -- an extension fostered by the state in order to assure 
provisioning of grain-short regions, and 'above all of Paris. 6 
Anti-capitalist motives are no less apparent in protests against enclosures, another very 
common form of eighteenth and early nineteenth century collective violence. In this case the rural 
poor invaded meadows or forests that had been enclosed by landlords. In doing so, they were 
affirming traditional collective rights of the village community that were suppressed when 
landlords claimed formerly common land a s  their private property. Once again, this extension of 
capitalist claims had been fostered by the state, which hoped thereby to encourage innovations and 
increase agricultural production.7 In other words, long before the supposed "bourgeois revolution" 
of 1789, the state seems commonly to have acted in French villages as  a promoter of capitalist 
development and as  an enemy of the collective rights of the poor. 
This account, centered around the rise of the state and state-fostered capitalism, leads 
Tilly to a novel periodization of French history. Where most historians see the French Revolution 
of 1789-94 as  the great turning point of French history, Tilly sees it principally as  an 
intensification of processes already well under way. In the Revolution, state centralization was 
accelerated and the victory of private property and the market over collective rights was 
consolidated -- and one consequence was a great burst of reactive violence as local people 
protested against these developments. According to Tilly's account, the extensive politicization of 
life during the Revolution also led to a major expansion of proactive collective action -- political 
meetings, demonstrations, and the like -- and therefore to many incidents of proactive violence. 
But the continuation of reactive violence indicates that the victory of state-building and capitalism 
was still incomplete. The real turning point of modern French history, Tilly implies, was the 
Revolution of 1848. Like the Revolution of 1789, the Revolution of 1848 gave rise to a great burst 
of of both reactive and proactive violence, one that continued sporadically until the fall of the 
Republic in 1851. But it also marked the final victory of the state over communal interests and 
therefore of proactive over reactive violence. After 185l,collective action in France definitively 
entered the world of political meetings, strikes, organized interest groups, demonstrations, political 
parties, and labor unions that is still with us today. Since then, the crucial issue for most French 
citizens has not been whether the state would intrude into their communities, but who would 
benefit from the state's ubiquitous presence.8 
Tillyys account of the history of collective violence obviously has much to recommend it. It 
pulls a vast welter of information together into an  admirably clear and economical interpretation. 
Moreover, it has significantly changed our understanding of French history. It  confirms and 
extends the notion that the French monarchical state in the century before the Revolution was 
already acting largely as  an ally of capitalist development. And it suggests a novel periodization 
of French history. According to Tilly's interpretation, the French Revolution was not a great 
turning point in the history of collective violence. It merely accelerated changes that were already 
in process. By contrast, the Revolution of 1848, which historians have usually considered as far 
less important than the "great" revolution, m a great turning point, since it spelled the de f~ i t i ve  
victory of proactive over reactive collective violence. 
It is this claim that the revolutionary episode of 1789-94 was less important than that of 
1848-51 that I wish to dispute. I believe that Tilly's own evidence indicates that the French 
Revolution of 1789 was in fact the more significant turning point, but that two important 
theoretical failings of his approach to collective violence have blinded him to its significance. I will 
argue first, that Tilly pays insufficient attention to the mltural dimension of historical processes, 
and second, that he virtually ignores the role of political even& in historical change. I will proceed 
by elaborating these theoretical critiques and then by developing my own alternative 
interpretation of the history of collective violence. I will argue that the French Revolution, as  an 
event, fundamentally transformed French political culture, defhing both new forms of collective 
loyalties and previously unimagined possibilities for collective action. The French Revolution, I 
shall argue, created the political and cultural space that made what Tilly calls "proactive" 
collective action possible. 
THEORETICAL CRITIQUE 
One sign of Tilly's inattention to culture is the fact that his writings on collective violence 
give no more than passing attention to the nature of the collective loyalties manifested in incidents 
of collective violence. He frequently uses words like "communal" or "associative" to characterize 
different groups, but he never defines the terms, nor does he attempt to show what is communal 
or associative about the groups. This lack of interest in the content of group loyalties or identities 
is only one example of Tilly's general indifference to the cultural or ideational life of the people he 
studies. Even in his study of the Vende'e -- in my opinion his most successful book -- he managed 
to write some 350 pages about a rebellion ostensibly fought in defense of the Catholic religion 
without devoting a single page to the rebels' religious beliefs. (There is plenty about the social 
organization of religion and about conflicts over the conduct of religion, but nothing about its 
~ o n t e n t . ~ )  In my opinion, this indifference to the meanings that collective action had for the actors 
has kept Tilly from correctly understanding major changes in French collective violence in his 
period. 
In the interpretation I shall elaborate in this article, I start from the assumption that all 
human action is shaped by and interpreted through cultural meanings. To understand why people 
join forces to beat up tax collectors, or to break down fences, or to march in a procession, or to 
engage in any kind of social action, collective or otherwise, requires understanding not only how 
these actions f i t  into large-scale patterns of social changes that the actors may understand only 
dimly, but also what the actors do understand by their actions. True, the actors do not generally 
leave detailed depositions preserving their motives for posterity. But much can be learned even 
from a relatively superficial examination of the nature of the collective actions themselves. For 
the remainder of this paper, I shall try to show how an analysis of the culturally specific collective 
loyalties that were expressed in violent actions can illuminate the general patterns of French 
history since the late seventeenth century. 
The second failing of Tilly's account is that it minimizes the significance of political events 
in history. Although Tilly's interpretation focuses on the rise of the state, and on political 
contention between the state and the various groups that compose society, it a political 
interpretation only in a very limited sense. For Tilly, as for Tocqueville, the rise of the state is a 
gradual, evolutionary, anonymous sociological process, analogous to industrialization, 
modernization, urbanization, or the development of capitalism. Although wars, political crises, or 
changes in regimes may accelerate or inhibit the rise of the state, the dynamics of the process are 
not specific to regimes and therefore are not fundamentally altered by regime changes. This 
means that, for Tilly, even the most spectacular outbursts of collective violence, such as  those that 
took place during the revolutions of 1789 and 1848, do not actually change the course of history. 
The collective action is not itself a cause of change, but merely an effect or a symptom of deeper 
lying causes. The course of history is determined by anonymous sociological processes operating 
behind or beneath the frenetic struggles and contentions that Tilly actually describes in his articles 
and books. 
This has a rather disconcerting effect on Tilly's narrative, especially in his long and 
detailed recent book The Contentious Frencb. Tilly is a truly accomplished stylist, and in this book 
he has related scores of dramatic incidents of collective violence with all the the considerable 
rhetorical resources he can muster. Yet the book has a curiously flat quality that I initially found 
puzzling -- until I realized that the incidents related in such loving detail were actually marginal to 
the central argument of the book, merely secondary consequences of processes of state and 
capitalist development that take place off stage, and that those central processes are actually 
posited a t  the outset rather than revealed and analyzed in the course of the book. 
Contentious French consequently reads as  a kind of extended and elaborate illustration of a 
previously developed theory rather than as a voyage of discovery. It recounts hundreds of events, 
but the events it recounts are not consequential for the central story Tilly wishes to tell. 
Once again, my alternative account of the history of French collective violence will depart 
sharply from Tilly's assumptions. I agree with Tilly that state development, in France and 
elsewhere, is typically characterized by certain trends that hold more or less irrespective of the 
regime in power -- such as  increasing scale, complexity, and bureaucratization. I also am 
convinced by Tilly's research that these developments, together with the allied development of 
capitalism, have had significant effects on the nature and incidence of collective violence. But I 
also hold that changes in the fprnra of collective violence -- which tend to be relatively abrupt -- 
cannot adequately be explained by changes in state capacity and capitalist development that by 
their nature are relatively gradual and incremental. I argue instead that forms of collective 
action, and therefore of collective violence, are profoundly affected by the changing forms of the 
state on whose territory they occur. Major political upheavals -- such as  the French revolutions of 
1789, 1830, and 1848 -- effect changes not only in states' institutions of government, coercion, 
and control, but in their cultural foundations as well. Such regime changes institute redefinitions 
of sovereignty, of legitimate forms of political action, and of the nature and identities of legal and 
social categories in civil society. Regime changes are crucial in the history of collective violence 
because they significantly reconstitute the bases of collective loyalties and collective action. 
Political events, then, are of central importance to explaining changing forms of collective violence. 
But it also is true that collective violence is centrally important in effecting changes in political 
regimes. Riots, revolts, strikes, and insurrections bring down old regimes and help to define the 
shape of new regimes. Far from being mere effects of anonymous sociological causes, incidents of 
collective violence contribute importantly to shaping the history of states and consequently to 
changing the shape of collective violence itself. 
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN THE OLD REGIME 
According to my reading of Tilly's own evidence, virtually all acts of collective violence that 
took place between the late seventeenth century and the French Revolution were undertaken by or 
on behalf of a corporate community of some kind. Although the purpose of the actions and the 
specific identity of the groups varied enormously, the ways in which claims could be formulated 
and the kinds of groups that could be mobilized on behalf of these claims was constrained by the 
culturally available means of forming collective loyalties. In France of the old regime, these 
loyalties were necessarily corporate. 
According to official representations of the social order, the entire realm of France was 
composed of corporate bodies. A remonstrance by the Parlement of Paris dating from 1776 states 
this view succinctly. 
Your subjects, Sire, are divided into as many different bodies as  there are different 
estates in the Kingdom. The Clergy, the Nobility, the sovereign courts, the lower 
tribunals, the officers attached to these tribunals, the universities, the academies, 
the chartered companies ... in every part of the State bodies exist which can be 
regarded as links in a great chain, the first link of which is in the hands of Your 
Majesty as head and sovereign administrator of all that constitutes the body of the 
Nation. lo 
The kingdom itself is a body, with the king as its head, and with a congeries of subordinate bodies 
as its members, or, employing the Parlement's mixed metaphor, as links in a chain. It should be 
noted that the Parlement's list of the corporate bodies composing the kingdom, while quite 
extensive, is far from complete. It does not, for example, list the countless additional bodies of 
magistrates and officials, or the provinces, or the cities, or the religious orders, or the trade guilds, 
let alone the more shadowy and contested corporate bodies of the rural and urban poor that were 
likely to get involved in violent incidents. 
What was the nature of these corporations as  communities? Their very existence and 
identity depended on their possession of privileges. Privileges were, literally, private laws. A 
. corporation, according to the jurists, was a distinct legal person, and its privileges were the laws, 
rights, and exemptions that belonged to it privately. A corporation's privileges were derived from 
grants or donations by the king, or from custom, or from "immemorial possession," as the phrase 
went. But.they depended, ultimately, upon the king, who, as  God's vicar, was the font of all 
worldly honor. A corporation was, thus, a distinct, self-regulating community, whose members 
were bound to each other and divided from members of any other body by their common 
possession of a particular set of accumulated privileges. 11 
Corporate bodies of the sort listed by the Parlement or described by the jurists could 
produce parchments or printed documents that stated their privileges in exhaustive detail. They 
actually had plenty of occasions to do so, since their claims were constantly being threatened by 
other bodies with overlapping claims or by agents of the state. A society composed of privileged 
corporations was rife with conflicts over jurisdiction, powers, and precedence. 'A revealing 
example is provided by Jean-Claude Perrot's study of the provincial city Caen in the eighteenth 
century. He shows how the trade guilds in Caen were involved in incessant lawsuits against each 
other: tanners against curriers, curriers against shoemakers, tailors against old-clothes dealers, 
grocers against apothecaries, blacksmiths against cutlers, and so on. These conflicts were serious 
business: the loser might be swallowed up by the winner, like the twelve different trades, ranging 
' 
from cutlers to tapestry weavers, who were annexed by the mercers of Caen between 1700 and 
1762. l2 Besides these internecine battles, the guilds also had to defend themselves against a 
state bent on reforms. In 1776, the royal administration formally abolished the guilds altogether, 
and even when the abolition was rescinded a few months later, the guilds were consolidated, 
streamlined and otherwise "reformed" by decree of the government. l3 Finally, the guilds also 
had to defend themselves against private individuals who attempted to exercise the trade in 
violation of the guild's exclusive privilege. Officially recognized corporations such as  the trade 
guilds were constantly in conflict either with one another, or with interlopers who sought to avoid 
their jurisdiction, or with that most powerful of all corporations, the state. Since they had official 
legal standing, their aggressive or defensive actions usually took the form of lawsuits -- or, 
alternatively, of using their connections to influence the actions of the king and his agents. 
Generally speaking, violent actions were the recourse of corporate bodies -- or of would-be 
corporate bodies -- whose privileges lacked clear legal standing. 
The poor and powerless classes of pre-revolutionary France were rarely able to establish 
full-fledged, officially recognized corporate organizations. Yet when they organized themselves 
they did so in corporate forms, and when they acted in defense of their interests they understood 
and justified those interests in terms consistent with the overall corporate constitution of society. 
An extreme and extremely interesting case of unrecognized, illegal corporate organizations were 
cornpagnonnages, secret brotherhoods of young journeyman artisans that were the most important 
form of workers' organizations in France from the seventeenth century down to the 1830s. 
Compagnonnages were, in many respects, more corporate than the officially recognized 
corporations. If corporations based their privileges on venerable grants by French kings, the 
compagnonnages traced theirs all the way back to foundation by King Solomon in biblical times. 
If corporations had formal statutes to govern their activities, cornpagnonnages were governed by 
unbelieveably elaborate rules, filled with the most exacting punctilio. If corporations enhanced 
their dignity and reaffirmed their collective loyalty by means of periodic rituals, the celebrations of 
the compagnonnages were both more frequent and more elaborate. And if corporations were 
.* 
constantly engaged in conflicts to defend their privileges, compagnonnages struggled not only 
against their employers and the employers' guilds, against state authorities who attempted to 
stamp them out, and against journeymen who refused to join their brotherhoods, but against rival 
sects of cornpagnonnages. There were in fact three sects of cornpagnonnages, which regarded the 
others as  apostates and staged ambushes, raids, and bloody battles a t  every possible opportunity. 
These combats were a very common form of collective violence in urban France right down to the 
1840s. l4 
But it was unusual for the poor and powerless to succeed in creating such elaborate 
corporate organizations as compagnonnages. In the villages of rural France, communities tended 
to lack either the elaborate secret organizations of the urban journeymen or the legally enforceable 
privileges of officially recognized corporations. There were corporate organizations in many 
villages, but their privileges generally depended almost exclusively on the strength of local custom. 
Important examples were "youth abbies" or "bachelors' companies" -- organizations of the young 
bachelors of the village which often took the form of religious confraternities. These youth abbies 
had the customary function of maintaining surveillance over courting and marriage behavior, and 
it was they who performed charivaris outside the windows of an old widower who had just married 
a young woman, or sa t  a husband who had been beaten by his wife backwards on an ass and 
dragged him through the street whacking him with wooden spoons, or otherwise mocked and 
mistreated those who had outraged local standards of propriety. They were de facto corporations 
endowed with the customary privilege of punishing those who violated the standards of the village . 
community. 15 
It is particularly important to recognize that the whole range of violent actions Tilly 
classifies a s  "reactive" were based on claims of a corporate type. This is true of the tax rebellion, 
the grain riot, and the invasion of enclosure. In the tax rebellion, the villagers' assaults on tax 
collectors were justified by the claim that the village was obliged to pay only the k i d s  and the 
level of taxation it had customarily paid in the past. In these riots the villagers invoked their 
particular established rights and privileges as a community and they resorted to violence to defend 
those rights. Their action was actually indistinguishable in its b t i f i c a t i o ~  from the nobility's 
long and much more successful resistance against the crown's attempts to force h to pay new 
taxes. The difference was that the nobility could defend its legally recognized privileges by legal 
and nonviolent means, while the peasants could defend theirs only by violent resistance -- 
resistance that was invariably overcome by the superior force of the state. 16 
Similarly, the grain riot was an attempt to defend the village community against those 
who violated its customary right to purchase locally produced grain. Here one common feature of 
the grain riot is particularly revealing. Grain rioters often demanded that local officials carry out 
the traditional but no longer enforced market regulations requiring all locally-produced grain to be 
put up for sale in the local market place. And the common practice of selling seized grain a t  a 
'"just price" indicates that the rioters saw themselves a s  collectively filling the role abandoned by 
local officials. The grain riot, like the tax riot, was an assertion, through violent action, of the 
customary community privileges that public authorities would no longer recognize. 17 
A similar pattern was repeated in invasions of enclosure. The men and women who broke 
down fences to gather firewood or to graze their cattle on enclosed land did so to enforce the 
villagers' long-standing but recently denied communal rights to use the land. Again, they justified 
their actions in terms of the particular rights of the community, sometimes even citing the lord 
who had originally granted these rights. Thus Tilly describes the invasion of a wood by 
seventeenth-century winegrowers from Dijon. They cited their right to cut wood, which they said 
was the "result of concessions granted to the winegrowers by the Duke of Burgundy, as  has often 
been practiced in the past when required by bad weather as  in the present year when the need is 
great."18 Once again, the rural community had to enforce its customary rights and privileges by 
direct action because effective legal redress was denied. 
This admittedly all-too-brief survey of collective violence under the old regime leads to 
important conclusions. An examination of the claims put forward by the perpetrators of violent 
acts makes it clear that the actors were exerting themselves on behalf of what they saw as a 
legitimate corporate community, defined, like any other corporate community, by its customary 
rights and privileges. In undertaking violent action, members of village communities were 
asserting their existence as corporations no less substantial than the other corporations that 
composed the state. If their claims were "backward-looking" it is because the only public claims 
that were recognized in a corporate society were claims to pre-existing privileges. (It should be 
noted in passing that all sorts of innovative and aggressive actions undertaken by corporations 
were formulated and justified in backward-looking terms.) If the scope of these actions rarely 
extended beyond the local community, it is because the corporate loyalties of pre-revolutionary 
France were defined by the specific privileges of a particular community. For ordinary French 
men and women before the Revolution of 1789, loyalties defined in terms of abstract rights, or 
voluntary associations, or a common relation to the means of production would have seemed 
absurd. They fought for the maintenance of their customary corporate privileges, and therefore 
for their very existence as  recognized units of a corporate social order. 
THE REVOLUTIONARY RUPTURE 
For Tilly, the French Revolution of 1789 marked no rupture in the history of collective 
action. I believe that he is mistaken. The French Revolution was not, as  Tilly implies, just 
another step in the long march of rising state power. It totally redefined the nature of the French 
state and society. By doing so, it also created entirely new possibilities for collective action. The 
revolutionaries annihilated all legally established corporations and set out to build a new state on 
the basis of natural rights, civil equality, individual liberty, and national sovereignty. The new 
social order began with what it took to be a given of nature -- independent, individual persons 
endowed with natural rights. The state was formed on this natural basis by a social contract, an 
act of voluntary agreement among hitherto independent individuals to associate with one another 
under common laws in pursuit of the common good. The nation or state formed by this act of 
association was a creation of the general will; as  such it was to command the supreme loyalty of 
all its citizens. 
I would argue that this redefinition of the state made possible for the first time the kind of 
. 
collective action Tilly calls "proactive" -- that is, action based on formally organized voluntary 
associations attempting to influence national policies of the state. Even before the Revolution, the 
eighteenth century in France was a time of considerable experimentation in forms of social 
relations. A number of new types of organizations contributed importantly to one of the most 
potent novelties of the eighteenth century: the formation of a public sphere and "public opinion." l9 
But such associations were either informal (the salons) or privileged bodies under royal charter 
(the various royal and provincial academies) or secret and defined by elaborate oaths and ritual 
(freemasons). Openly organized voluntary associations that discussed public issues, and that 
consequently could engage in "proactive" collective action, were strictly illegal under the old 
regime. I t  was not until the heady days of the "prerevolution," when the state's monopoly on 
public affairs had utterly collapsed, that the first public voluntary associations appeared (for 
example the abolitionist organization "La Soci6t.4 des Amis des Noirs"). But it was above all the 
redefinition of the state itself in associational terms in 1789 that made the voluntary association 
available a s  a basis of collective action by ordinary French men and women. All over the country, 
citizens joined together in associations to discuss the public good and to influence the course of the 
revolution. These associations differed sharply from corporate bodies. They claimed no privileges 
and their members were bound to one another only by their voluntary adherence to the association 
and their common vision of the public good. These political societies spawned a great deal of 
collective violence in the revolutionary years as  they organized processions, demonstrations, and 
public meetings -- and sometimes punitive raids -- to promote their vision of the public welfare. 2 0 
If the French Revolution effectively created the voluntary association a s  a basis for 
collective action, it also created a for the first time a national public sphere in which such groups 
could act. Under the old regime's corporate definition of the state, only the king and the Royal 
administration could claim to be truly public actors. Corporate bodies, by contrast, were private 
or particular rather than public. Corporations were expected to act in defense of their particular 
privileges, but they could not claim a positive role in shaping public policy -- that was a monopoly 
of the royal will. But when sovereignty was declared to inhere in a nation composed of free and 
equal individual citizens rather than in the person of the monarch, individuals, and freely formed 
associations of individuals, became legitimate public actors, fully capable of envisioning the 
national public good and of acting upon their visions. The revolution, in short, made possible not 
only a new associationally based form of collective action, but "forward-looking" or programatic 
action aimed a t  the nation state. I t  established for the first time the conditions for Tilly's 
"proactive" collective action. 
It also followed from the French Revolution's redefinition of the state that neither collective 
action nor collective loyalties could be restricted to a particular community. Corporately defined 
communities were by nature highly particularistic. Their very existence was defined by the 
possession of particular privileges, and they lacked both the inclination and the right to band 
together to pursue goals that spanned more than one corporate community. But in the new 
national state, the citizens had to be empowered to act in concert with fellow citizens not only in 
their own village or trade, but all over the nation. Thus such associations a s  the Jacobin Club 
could have &bated chapters in dozens of cities and towns all across the country. Based on the 
general category of citizen and on national rather than particular loyalties, the Jacobins formed a 
coordinated, nation-wide movement of a kind that would have been impossible -- indeed 
unthinkable -- for the corporate groups of the old regime. 
Finally, the French Revolution also invented a new and supreme category of collective 
violence: the popular insurrection. There were, of course, large scale uprisings against constituted 
authority long before the French Revolution. These were more or less interchangeably called 
insurrections, revolts, uprisings, mutinies, rebellions or seditions. But the meaning of insurrection 
was transformed and elevated in the Revolution so that it was no longer a synonym for revolt, 
mutiny, rebellion, or sedition. Whereas these terms continued to imply an illegitimate uprising of 
some fraction of the population against state authority, burrect ion became the name for an 
uprising of the sovereign people, an uprising that, upon succeeding, formed the very basis of the 
state's legitimacy.21 The first great popular insurrection of the Revolution, the storming of the 
Bastille on July 14, 1789, was a relatively spontaneous uprising against a perceived threat of 
Fbyal aggression; it was continuous with any number of old regime revolts or rebellions. But in 
retrospect, it came to be interpreted as an insurrection in a new sense: a self-conscious attempt on 
the part of the French people to overthrow the old regime and to establish a new governing power, 
in this case the National Assembly. If the storming of the Bastille was essentially spontaneous 
and was not experienced a s  an insurrection in the new sense a t  the time, later insurrections, such 
as  those of August 1792, May-June 1793, or the nineteenth century insurrections of 1830, 1834, 
1839, 1848, 1870, and 1871 were specifically understood by their participants as  uprisings in 
which the people would impose their sovereign will on the state by overthrowing the existing 
government and establishing another more to their liking.22 Insurrections, both failed and 
successful, were of course rare events in a statistical sense, but they were obviously of enormous 
importance to post-revolutionary French politics. And they could only exist in a the political 
universe created by the revolution, one in which sovereignty was believed to rest in the people. 
The French Fkvolution, in summary, created momentous new possibilities for collective 
action. It  created and disseminated widely a new associational idiom of group organization and 
loyalty. It created a national public sphere in which ordinary citizens and their associations were 
legitimate public actors. And it created the popular insurrection as a legitimate and self-conscious 
means of changing political regimes. In all of these ways, it opened a new era in the history of 
French collective loyalties and collective action. 
A LONG TRANSITION 
The French Fkvolution was, then, an utterly crucial turning point in the history of French 
collective violence, one in which Tilly's "proactive" violence first emerged. But the revolution did 
e 
not change everything. The traditional "competitive" and "reactive" forms of violence -- the food 
riot, the tax revolt, the invasion of enclosure, the charivari -- lived on for another six decades, 
flared up once again alongside massive incidence of "proactive" violence from 1848 to 1851, but 
then abruptly disappeared from the scene. From 1789 to 1851, two different forms of collective 
violence, based on two different forms of collective loyalties, flourished side by side. This poses 
two questions: why this long coexistence? and why the disappearance of the older forms after 
1851? I will offer three reasons. 
The first reason is Tilly's. State centralization and capitalist development were quite 
incomplete during the French Fkvolution, and both progressed only gradually during the ensuing 
sixty years. The Second Empire actually marked a distinct acceleration in both processes. In & 
Contentious French, Tilly prints a telling graph of the French state's police budget from 1825 to 
1880, and it shows an remarkable leap in the 1 8 5 0 s . ~ ~  This form of state centralization, a t  least, 
was highly concentrated in the period when reactive violence disappeared. Moreover, the 
authoritarian political system installed by Napoleon 111 was based on an intrusive management of 
elections in villages all over France by means of patronage, threats, and inducements; it 
paradoxically had the effect of making even previously unpoliticized rural populations far more 
aware than before of the importance of national political forces.24 The Second Empire also had a 
particularly rapid rate of economic growth;25 of particular significance for the development of a 
national economy, this was the era when the basic French rail network was laid. But how, one 
might ask, could the sudden disappearance of a form of collective violence in 1852 be explained by 
an acceleration of capitalist development and state centralization that only herran in that same 
year? In fact, the claim is far from absurd. The police state that was established a t  the beginning 
of the Second Empire was so repressive that dl forms of collective violence -- competitive, 
reactive, and proactive -- essentially disappeared together from 1852 until 1 8 6 7 . ~ ~  But when the 
Empire was liberalized in the later 1860s and political life revived, only proactive forms of 
collective action and violence reemerged. It is reasonable to claim that the rapid pace of state 
formation and capitalist development in the intervening decade and a half could have contributed 
importantly to extinguishing corporate and local loyalties. 
The second reason it took so long for associationally organized and nationally oriented 
forms of collective action to displace corporately organized and locally oriented forms was that it 
also took a long time for the revolutionary political culture to win out over the political culture of 
the old regime. The First Republic, declared in 1792, was wildly unstable and finally collapsed 
when faced with Napoleon's coup d'etat in 1799. From then to 1848, France experimented with 
various hybrid forms of state and political culture: an Empire until 1815, a reactionary Legitimist 
but constitutional monarchy from then to 1830, and a liberal constitutional monarchy until 1848. 
During a period when France was suspended between revolutionary and monarchical or 
aristocratic forms of government, it is hardly surprising that collective action also was suspended 
between "reactive" and "proactive" forms. Moreover, some important "hybrid" forms of collective 
organization, which combined both corporate and associational principles, were developed during 
this period.27 But if the unstable stalemate between revolutionary and monarchical political 
cultures helps to explain why reactive collective violence survived down to the Second Republic, it 
certainly cannot explain why such forms of violence disappeared during the Second Empire, yet 
another hybrid regime that ruled from 1852 to 1870. 
The third reason is perhaps not so much a separate reason as a specification of how the 
long struggle between revolutionary and monarchist political cultures affected forms of collective 
action. The development of associative organizational forms was not, as  Tilly's narrative implies, 
merely the outcome of the anonymous macro-social processes of capital formation and state 
building. It  was, rather, the subject of sustained, self-conscious, and complex political struggles. 
In the remainder of this article, I will sketch out the crucial but little remarked history of the 
politics of association from the French Revolution to the Second Empire. This history helps to 
explain, I believe, both the intermingling of different forms of collective action for much of the 
nineteenth century and the triumph of proactive or associative collective actions and loyalties in 
the waning years of the Second Empire. 
The French Revolution of 1789, by making the state itself into an association, certainly 
launched an associational organizational idiom in French politics and society. However, this idiom 
also had some important restrictions. Above all, revolutionary legislation recognized the 
legitimacy of only one kind of association, the association formed to act on behalf of "la chose 
-," or the public good. In part because the Revolution had initially been made against the 
privileged and corporate order of the old regime, the revolutionaries were obsessed by the 
Rousseauean concept of the unitary general will. A nation or people, according to this doctrine, 
was a single and unified political body, and it could have only one will. Partial bodies could only 
fracture the general will, and hence could not be tolerated. Hence, when associationally 
constructed organizations such as the Jacobin clubs or the Parisian sections engaged in 
demonstrations or insurrections, they thought of themselves as  acting on behalf of the people as a 
whole, not on behalf of their association or of any class or group whose interests their association 
might represent. Associations formed to further the interests of any particular group -- say a 
profession, a region, a class, or an ethnic or religious group -- were regarded as  illegitimate, a s  
surreptitious attempts to revive the selfish interests of the abolished corporations. 
Revolutionary authorities could outlaw the formation of associations intermediate between 
the individual and the nation, but they could hardly keep people who lived and worked in specific 
communities and occupational groups from developing common sentiments and interests. In the 
first years of the revolution, when the boundaries of the new social and political order were still 
hazy, some groups in fact attempted to redefine their formerly corporate group loyalties in terms 
of the new associational idiom. During 1790 and 1791, for example, journeymen in a number of 
Parisian trades formed associations -- such as  "The Typographical and Philanthropic Club," or the 
"Fraternal Union of Workers in the Art of Carpentry" -- that attempted to represent the interests 
of workers in relations with their employers.28 I believe that the brief flowering of such 
associations represented an important but suppressed possibility of the Revolution -- a wholesale 
restructuring of selective old regime group loyalties into new associationally based loyalties, a 
restructuring that could have been undertaken by ordinary people rather than a t  the initiative of 
w 
the revolutionary state. But the authorities choked off such possibilities quickly. As soon as  the 
existence of such associations was brought to the attention of the National Assembly, it outlawed 
them in the famous Le Chapelier Law -- on the grounds, a s  the law's preamble put it, that . 
there are no longer corporations in the State; there is no longer anything but the 
particular interest of each individual, and the general interest. It is permitted to no 
one to inspire an intermediary interest in citizens, to separate them from the public 
interest by a spirit of corporation. 2 9 
Rather than embracing a possibile proliferation of popularly constructed associations 
representing various "intermediate" interests, the revolutionary legislators branded such 
associations and interests a s  counter-revolutionary. The consequence was that the associative 
organizational vocabulary bequeathed by the revolution to the nineteenth century contained no 
legitimate means of expressing loyalty to groups intermediate between the individual and the 
nation as a whole. It should therefore hardly be surprising that peasants, artisans, and workers, 
who were denied the possibility of transforming their preexisting corporate loyalties into 
acceptable associational forms, continued to conceptualize their loyalties in familiar corporate 
terms. And this, of course, also implied that they continued to engage in "competitive" and 
"reactive" forms of collective violence. 
Ordinary people had no strong motive for developing an associational vocabulary for 
organizing intermediary interests either under the highly repressive Imperial regime that snuffed 
out the First French Republic in 1799, or under the vaguely corporatist and less repressive 
Bourbon Monarchy that replaced it in 1815 -- although, by the same token, neither regime 
restored pre-revolutionary corporate institutions either. But the Revolution of 1830 put the issue 
of associations back onto the political agenda. The Liberal monarchy established in 1830 greatly 
relaxed restrictions on the formation of associations, and workers, especially in Paris and Lyon, 
responded by transforming their existing corporate organizations into politically active 
"philanthropic" trade associations remarkably similar in language and form to those created in 
1790 and 1791. By 1833, workers' associations, aided by the left wing of the republican 
opposition, began to claim that association was in fact the most important of all citizen rights, and 
a t  the same time began to use their associative organizations to impose collective regulations over 
conditions of labor by means of strikes. Faced by this proliferation of associationally based 
agitation, the government panicked: early in 1834 it passed a statute outlawing the associations 
that workers had established. This provocation resulted in an insurrection by workers both in 
Paris and Lyon -- who rose up against what they saw as  the government's callous denial of the 
sacred right to associate.30 
The insurrection was quickly put down, but the issue of association was not so easily 
repressed. In the course of the later 1830s and 1840s, the republican opposition to the 
monarchical regime became a firm advocate of freedom of association, largely in order to attract 
widespread working-class support.31 And when the republicans were put in power by a new 
insurrection in February of 1848, they immediately lifted all restrictions on associations. The 
consequence was an immediate proliferation of all kinds of associations in every corner of the 
country. The Revolution of 1848, in other words, finally legitimated associations of &l types, 
including those that expressed the interests of some group intermediate between the state and the 
individual. Moreover, the associationally based political agitation of the Second Republic 
penetrated considerably deeper into the villages of rural France than had the comparable 
agitations of the First Republic.32 
The Second Empire, of course, suppressed most of the associations that had flourished 
under the Second Republic. But when Napoleon 111 decided to liberalize the Empire in the mid- 
1860s, one of his key strategies was to coopt a major Republican issue by gradually easing 
restrictions on associations -- for example, by granting workers the right to strike in 1864, and by 
allowing public meetings and legalizing the formation of labor unions in 1868. Even combined, 
these measures failed to reinstate fully the right of association that had been suppressed a t  the 
time of Louis Napoleon's coup d'etat in 1851, but they clearly moved in that direction. These 
measures, along with the general liberalization of the Empire -- the relaxation of state control over 
the press, the increasing authority and autonomy of the legislature, the restoration of reasonably 
free elections -- did not, as the Emperor had hoped, result in a wave of gratitude from the public. 
Rather, it touched off a series of public demonstrations, electoral rallies, and violent strikes in 
c 1868-69, followed by a disastrous electoral defeat of the Bonapartists in 1869. These political 
catastrophes forced the Emperor to name Emile Ollivier, a staunch supporter of the liberty of 
association and other liberal measures, a s  Prime Minister in 1870. Had this "Liberal Empire" not 
been cut short by defeat in the Franco-Prussian War and the consequent Republican revolution of 
September 4, the Second Empire, rather than the Third Republic, would have made associations 
the normal, unproblematic means of organizing and expressing the interests and acting out the 
loyalties of all kinds of groups, political and otherwise. 
In the long struggle between republican and monarchical political cultures, the question of 
the right to form associations played an increasingly central role. Initially neither republicans nor 
monarchists favored legalizing associations that would represent interests and loyalties 
intermediate between the individual and the state. But following the great burst of associationally 
based working-class activity in the wake of the Revolution of 1830, the republican opposition 
embraced the right of association a s  a fundamental liberty. Thereafter, the founding of a republic 
necessarily entailed establishing freedom of association, and even the Second Empire was driven 
to the same measures as  a desperate means of staving off a republican victory. I t  was in the 
crucible of political struggle that associative forms of organization and collective action were forged 
and reforged. The rise of the associative organizational idiom, and consequently of "proactive" 
collective action, was governed not by the relatively gradual and continuous rhythms of state and 
capital forination, but by the highly punctual and syncopated rhythms of political struggle. The 
major turning points were moments -- the aftermath of the revolutions of 1789, 1830, 1848 and of 
the liberalization of the Second Empire in the late 1860s -- when deep political crises put the very 
categories of state and society up for grabs. "Proactive" collective action was not a natural and 
inevitable outgrowth of economic and political centralization. Otherwise it would have appeared 
long before 1789 and its post-revolutionary history would have been far less convoluted. It was, 
rather, a political and cultural invention with an autonomous (or a t  least relatively autonomous) 
political and cultural history. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Much of Tilly's account of the history of French collective violence survives the scrutiny to 
which I have subjected it in this article. His typology of collective violence gets a t  important 
differences and makes it possible to specify the nature and direction of long-term changes in the 
way ordinary French people envisaged and acted on their collective interests. He has convincingly 
argued that the centralization of the French state and the rise of a capitalist economy are major 
determinants of the nature of collectke struggles. And he has identified and drawn attention to a 
crucial and previously underappreciated turning point -- the Revolution of 1848 and the ensuing 
political struggles -- that marked the end of a long epoch of "competitive" and "reactive" of 
collective violence. 
But Tilly's account also has important limitations and confusions. First, because he is not 
interested in the cultural meaning embodied in forms of collective action, he does not recognize the 
full implications of his typological distinctions between "proactive" violence on the one hand and 
"reactive" and "competitive" violence on the other. Tilly apparently regards this distinction as  
purely instrumental, as merely a useful way of summarizing empirical differences that show up in 
cases of violent action. Hence he has blithely changed his terminology every few years, and has 
come perilously close to dropping the distinction altogether in The Contentious French. He has 
labelled different types of collective violence by shifting and relatively superficial features -- by 
whether they are "backward looking" or "forward looking" (primitive vs. reactionary vs. modern), 
by what relation, if any, they have to state policies (competitive vs reactive vs proactive), or by 
how closely they are tied to local issues and social superiors (parochial and patronized vs national 
and autonomous). What Tilly has failed to recognize is that the forms of collective violence are 
linked to two successive cultural constitutions of the French state and society -- the first 
monarchical, Christian, and corporate and the second republican, secular, and associational. 
This blindness to the cultural dimension of collective action is closely linked to his 
underestimation of the importance of the French Revolution. I t  was, after all, the French 
Revolution that accomplished the cultural reconstitution of political and social categories that is 
reflected in the contrast between reactive and proactive violence. By suppressing privileged 
corporations and creating a new state legitimated by the rhetoric of social contract, the French 
Revolution established a new public sphere and instituted a powerful new associative idiom in 
whose terms French men and women could now define and act out their social loyalties. These 
new forms of collective actions and collective loyalties gave rise to new types of collective violence, 
including the insurrection, a new category of public violence that stood a t  the very foundation of 
the revolutionary state. The French Revolution did not, of course, result in a sudden and complete 
change in forms of collective violence. The continuing social and cultural power of old regime 
collective loyalties, together with the uncertain legal status of the new associative organizational 
forms, gave competitive and reactive forms of collective violence a continuing lease on life down to 
the middle of the nineteenth century. The French Revolution, in other words, launched a new era 
of associatively based collective action. I t  was followed by a sixty year transitional period during 
which both associative and corporate forms of collective action and loyalties shared the stage, 
until, from the mid 1860s on, associative collective action finally gained the monopoly it has held 
ever since. 
The French Revolution of 1789 must, consequently, be regarded as a t  least as  important a 
turning point as the Revolution of 1848. 1789 marked the beginning of a long period of transition 
from corporate to associative forms of collective action -- a period also characterized by the 
development of hybrid quasi-corporate associations -- that 1848 brought to an  end. But I think 
there are actually strong arguments for regarding 1789 a s  the more significant turning point. 
First, 1789 marked the creation of an  entire new category of collective action, while 1848 saw no 
such fundamental cultural creativity. Moreover, the emergence of the new category of proactive 
collective violence in 1789 was relatively sudden and clear, whereas the disappearance of the old 
competitive and reactive forms took place over a longer,period of time -- from 1851 to the middle 
1860s -- and by a process that, in my account as  in Tilly's, remains considerably more obscure. 
The period of transition that lasted from the French Revolution to the liberalization of the Second 
Empire began with a bang, but it ended with something of a whimper. 
Tilly has greatly underestimated the significance of the French Revolution in the history of 
French collective violence. This failure of historical judgement is symptomatic, I believe, of a more 
fundamental theoretical problem, an  "evolutionary" conceptualization of temporality that mars not 
only Tilly's work, but much writing in historical sociology generally. Rather than seeing history 
as composed of a series of largely contingent "events" that reconfigure existing social and cultural 
structures or forces, historical sociologists commonly assert the primacy of long-term, anonymous 
trends that underlie supposedly superficial events and provide the real meaning of history. In 
part this assertion has always been a means for sociologists to claim a distinctive and more 
scientific form of knowledge than that produced by their academic rivals the historians, who have 
traditionally emphasized the importance of accident, personality, and choice in shaping the course 
of history. 
Because Tilly sees modern history a s  shaped by the underlying master processes of state 
centralization and capitalist development, he understands such events as  the French revolutions of 
1789 and 1848 only a s  accelerations of existing sociological processes rather than as  deep political 
and cultural reconfigurations of existing forces and structures capable of changing the very 
directions and dynamics of history. Here, Tilly is squarely within the great tradition of sociology, 
as  represented not only by Tocqueville and Marx, but by Tonnies (Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft), 
Weber (rationalization), grid Durkheim (mechanical to organic solidarity), and more recently by 
hordes of writers on modernization -- all of whom insist that it is the anonymous long-term 
evolutionary dynamics of societies, rather than such political events a s  wars, revolutions, 
liberalizations, conquests, monarchical successions, or reforms that give shape and meaning to 
history.33 
I do not wish to dispute the essential truth of the sociologists' argument against traditional 
historiography -- that, mesmerized by the play of political events, it ignored the operation of more 
anonymous social forces that shape the course of history. But most historians have long since 
a 
conceded this point; the great revolution that has swept over historiographical practice during 
since the 1960s -- as exemplified by the French Annales school, the British Marxist historians, or 
the American new social history -- has been based on precisely this recognition. Indeed, the 
Annalistes, a t  least until recently, have been a s  explicitly and systematically hostile to what 
Braudel stigmatized a s  "l'histoire e'vene'mentielle" (history of events) as  any historical 
s o c i ~ l o g i s t . ~ ~  The task facing the current generation of historical sociologists and social 
historians, as I see it, is to find means of simultaneously recognizing the importance of long-term 
and anonymous historical processes auba the transformative power of events. I hope my analysis 
of the history of French collective violence contributes to this effort. 
I have argued that a s  important a s  such anonymous sociological processes as state 
centralization and capitalist development are, they are far from sufficient to explain why, when, 
or how forms of collective action, and hence of collective violence, have changed through history. I . 
have attempted to demonstrate that historical events -- preeminently, in this case, revolutions, but 
also restorations, failed insurrections, coups d'e'tat, and liberalizations -- fundamentally shape 
people's collective loyalties and actions. I have also attempted to demonstrate that political events 
have a transformative power that goes beyond such obvious political effects as redistribution of 
power or reshaping of political strategies. Events, I argue, are powerful largely because they are 
literally significant. They shape history by changing the cultural meanings or significations of 
political and social categories, consequently changing people's possibilities for meaningful action. 
In the case a t  hand, the French Revolution, supplemented by the subsequent elaboration of a 
broader associational vocabulary in the RRvolutions of 1830 and 1848, permanently transformed 
the way ordinary French men and women could conceptualize and act out their collective loyalties. 
In this case, and more generally, significant political events transformed the very dynamics of 
history. 
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